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NOTES
required in cases of property deprivation,64 while Perales supports the theory
that the Social Security Agency is run effectively. 5 The three cases were
utilized to stress SSA capacities for efficiency and the importance of such
efficiency under a narrow balancing test. 66 Thus, the decision in Eldridge
was based on a limited view of due process, combined with an obvious
satisfaction with SSA procedure.
Il1. CONCLUSION
Eldridge denotes reliance on the narrow view of procedural due process
found in Arnett and Mitchell, and casts new light on Goldberg by emphasiz-
ing the fact that only Goldberg has required an evidentiary pre-termination
hearing in order to satisfy due process requirements. Whether this signals a
narrowing of the requirement of pre-termination hearings in all situations is
not clear. The adoption of the reasoning found in prior Social Security
benefit cases, coupled with the emphasis placed upon the balancing ap-
proach, makes it logical to conclude that Eldridge delineates due process
requirements only with respect to its particular fact situation. The dissimi-
larity of the Eldridge and Goldberg opinions, despite the similarity of their
respective situations, creates speculation as to what the Court's approach to
due process will be in the future.67
Terri J. Lacy
Search Without Probable Cause in the Military-
A Constitutional Question
Enlisted members of the Army's European Command alleged in a class
action for declaratory and injunctive relief that various features of the drug
abuse prevention plan expounded in USAREUR Circular 600-851 and
adopted by the Command were unconstitutional. The plan included war-
rantless drug inspections without probable cause and provided that in-
formation obtained through its procedures could be used as a basis for
further disciplinary actions. The district court held that the plan offended
due process and that military necessity did not warrant unconstitutional intru-
64. See notes 21, 25 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
66. 96 S. Ct. at 909-10, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 41-42.
67. The substantial difference in the Court's approach in Goldberg and Eldridge
may be due to membership changes on the Supreme Court from 1970 to 1976. See gen-
erally Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FoRD. L. REV. 215 (1975), and Yarbrough, The Burger
Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37 (1976), for discussions
of the Burger Court's shift in ideology from that of the Warren Court.
1. USAREUR Circular 600-85, PERSONNEL GENERAL, USAREUR Alcohol




sions into the privacy of a soldier.2  The Army appealed. Held, reversed:
In light of the exigencies of military life all aspects of the drug prevention
plan are constitutional. Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d
466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
I. MILITARY NECESSITY VERSUS PRIVATE INTEREST
Under military law servicemen are entitled to all the constitutional guaran-
tees.3  These rights, however, are viewed in light of the exigencies of military
circumstances predicated upon the policy that the rights of persons in the
armed forces must be conditioned upon certain overriding demands of disci-
pline and duty necessary to maintain a ready, fighting force.4  An analysis
of what constitutional due process may require in the military must, there-
fore, include a determination of both the nature of the governmental function
and the private interests involved.
The fourth amendment declares the right of an individual to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Reasonableness is determined on
a case by case basis,5 and, although subject to close judicial scrutiny, warrant-
less searches within carefully defined limits have been upheld. 6 The military
allows warrantless searches by order of the commanding officer provided that
it can be shown that such order is based on probable cause.7 Probable cause
has been ruled a prerequisite for all searches, whether general or limited to
persons suspected of the offense.8
2. Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1974).
3. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47
(1960). Some guarantees, however, are expressly inapplicable to the military, such as
the fifth amendment right to a grand jury indictment.
4. In Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the court held that the express
purpose of the armed forces is to fight or to be ready to fight. This calls for an
organization built upon strict obedience and discipline. The rules which govern such an
organization must be conditioned by this fundamental need. The framers of the
Constitution entrusted Congress with the power to make specific rules and regulations to
govern the military. These rules reflect the underlying difference between military and
civilian life. See also Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
768 (1966); Go-Cart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
6. In United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973), cocaine was
discovered on defendant's person pursuant to a warrantless search based on mere
suspicion that defendant possessed a weapon. The court, holding the search legal, based
its determination of reasonableness on three criteria: (I) public necessity, (2) efficacy
of search, and (3) degree of intrusion. The defendant was in the boarding area of an
airport. The magnitude of the perils created by air piracy coupled with the fact that
defendant knew such searches might take place were held sufficient to make this search
and seizure reasonable. The fact that the authorities were looking for a weapon and not
cocaine was irrelevant since the search itself was legal. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959), in which the Court upheld a conviction of a homeowner who refused to
permit a municipal health inspector to enter his premises without a search warrant. In a
similar fact situation, however, the Court held that the defendant had a right to insist on
a search warrant in a non-emergency situation. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967).
7. United States v. Davenport, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 33 C.M.R. 364 (1963) (defend-
ant's car was searched by order of the commanding officer and the case was remanded
for failure to show that the order was based on probable cause). See also United States
v. Martinez, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 42, 36 C.M.R. 196, 198 (1966); United States v. Brown,
10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 487, 28 C.M.R. 48, 53 (1959).
8. See United States v. Lange, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458 (1965) (a
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There have been circumstances, however, when a more flexible standard
of "reasonable cause to believe" has replaced "probable cause" as a ground
for a search and seizure. 9 The common thread among military cases apply-
ing the "reasonable cause to believe" standard is that maintenance of security
and discipline may necessitate a search without probable cause.10 The
"reasonable cause to believe" standard is applied, therefore, if a balancing
of the interests involved shows that the need for military security and disci-
pline outweighs the individual rights which the fourth amendment seeks to
protect."I
In Warden v. Hayden12 the Supreme Court recognized that the principal
object of the fourth amendment is the protection of privacy rather than prop-
erty. 1  An English decision of 1765, upon which the framers of the Bill of
Rights based the fourth amendment,' 4 stated that "[i]t is not the breaking
of doors and rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offense, it is the invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security."'I5 In
Katz v. United States'6 Justice Harlan found that the fourth amendment pro-
tection hinged on two requirements: (1) actual subjective expectation of
privacy by the individual, and (2) that this expectation be recognized as
reasonable by society under this standard.' 7 Applying Katz to a military con-
text, one commentator has found four criteria by which to judge the extent
of the expectation of privacy of a soldier living in a barracks.' s These are:
(1) the degree of privacy afforded by the structural characteristics of the
barracks; (2) the soldier's subjective belief that a particular place is private;
(3) the soldier's right to exclusive use of a particular area; and (4) the
commanding officer's shakedown search for the fruits of a crime he merely suspected had
been committed was unreasonable and illegal); United States v. Gebhart, 10 U.S.C.M.A.
606, 28 C.M.R. 172 (1959) (shakedown inspection of a barracks after a camera was
reported stolen held to be unconstitutional).
9. For examples of constitutional searches not based on probable cause see United
States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1965) (search of work area of customs
agent by employers); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652, 655 (4th Cir. 1964) (took
note of military picket's search of living quarters); Moore v. The Student Affairs Comm.
of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (search of dormitory
rooms by college administration).
10. See, e.g., Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950) (maintenance of
security and discipline of United States Armed Forces based outside the fifty states may
allow lessening of the constitutional requirements of probable cause).
11. Richardson v. Zuppman, 81 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
12. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
13. Id. at 304.
14. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959), used as authority the case of
Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). See also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
15. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this case it was not the seizure of
property but rather the exploitation of a recorded conversation obtained while defendant
was talking on the phone in a public phone booth that was held to be unconstitutional
under the fourth amendment. See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960);
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310(1927); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
18. Eggers, The Specificity Required in Military Search Warrants, 61 MILrrTARY L.
Rav. 1, 36-37 (1975). Eggers admits that some amount of privacy is necessarily given
up by the soldier upon entering the military, and that this is known by the soldier and
expected by society. Eggers feels, however, that even in a barracks situation, and
certainly in private rooms, some reasonable amount of privacy is constitutionally
guaranteed the individual soldier.
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degree to which society honors the intimacy or privacy of an activity normally
carried on in such a place.' 9
A right of privacy may also be founded in a meshing of the fourth amend-
ment freedom with the fifth amendment guarantee that a person cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself. The United States Supreme Court
voiced such an opinion in Boyd v. United States,20 and the principle has
evolved from later cases that the two amendments work in harmony to form
a comprehensive right of privacy. 21 The comprehensive right of privacy
under this principle has been interpreted to encompass a right of reasonable
control over personal information.2 2
The method used to insure protection of the right of privacy is the exclu-
sionary rule. 23  In United States v. Calandra2 4 the Court held that the exclu-
sionary rule is a judicially created remedy and is designed as a safeguard for
the fourth amendment through its deterrent effect upon unlawful police con-
duct rather than as redress for the party aggrieved.25  Commentators have
submitted, however, that the utility of the exclusionary rule is not exhausted
by its power to deter; they suggest the rule is also a means of protecting an
individual's privacy and right against self-incrimination. 26
II. COMMITTEE FOR GI RIGHTS V. CALLAWAY
USAREUR Circular 600-85 was designed primarily to rehabilitate mem-
bers of the Armed Forces with problems attributable to alcohol and other
19. These criteria were adopted in United States v. Torres, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 46
C.M.R. 96 (1973). The court of military appeals stated that the test to be applied in
determining capacity to claim the protection of the fourth amendment is whether or not
the particular locale is one in which there is a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion. See also United States v. Adams, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 570, 18
C.M.R. 187, 194 (1955) (soldier's abode for purposes of trespass in tort is place where
he bunks and keeps his few private possessions).
20. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
21. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362 (1959); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117, 119 (1951); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacq: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 978 (1968); see Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE
L.J. 475, 482 (1968). An element of control of personal information has always been
analyzed as an indispensable component of all interpersonal relationships. It is, there-
fore, incumbent on society that its rules protect this control to some extent. The term
"information" is being used here in its broadest sense. Material things may represent
information in that they may be used as evidence or communicated to another.
23. This doctrine prohibits in a judicial proceeding the use of evidence obtained by
methods which are unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); United States v. Skipwith,
482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973); see note 14 supra and accompanying text.
24. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
25. Id. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); United States v.
Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1973).
26. The distinguishing characteristic of the fourth amendment is its limitation on the
means by which the Government can acquire evidence. The exclusionary rule is a tool
through which this limitation can be exercised. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emana-
tions and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 259, 278 (1965). The limitations are necessary
to protect the constitutional guarantee of privacy and the right against self-incrimination.
Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968 (1968). It follows, therefore, that the utility of
the exclusionary rule is not exhausted by its power to deter, but it has a further purpose




drugs and to eliminate from the service those who could not be restored in a
reasonable period of time.27 Nevertheless, any evidence obtained could be
used in subsequent disciplinary actions should the facts and circumstances in-
dicate further violations of army regulations. 28 If rehabilitation failed, a con-
firmed drug user could be separated from the service under other than honor-
able conditions, and military authorities could advise prospective government
or civilian employees of the soldier's drug involvement.29  The record of a
soldier's drug abuse could also be considered by the Army in connection with
future personnel action, including duty assignments and promotions.3 0
The district court found serious constitutional infirmities in the inspections
for drugs called for in -the USAREUR Circular 600-85. 31 The court specifical-
ly held that warrantless drug inspections without a showing of probable cause
were not justified by military necessity 32 since the use of information gained
by these inspections as a basis for punitive sanctions violated the soldier's con-
stitutional rights under the fourth amendment. 33  The district court stated
that the Army could continue conducting drug inspections and requiring par-
ticipation in a drug testing and rehabilitation program without probable cause
only if evidence obtained through these procedures was not used as a basis
for any punitive action.
Reversing the district court, the court of appeals relied heavily on such
cases as Parker v. Levy3 4 and Carlson v. Schlesinger35 to support its underly-
ing premise that the character of the military requires that military individ-
uals be accorded constitutional protections different in application from those
27. The circular categorizes drug abusers as (1) suspected, (2) identified, (3)
urinalysis positive, and (4) medically confirmed. A person is classified as a "suspected"
abuser if he has been under the influence of drugs or has shown excessive use of alcohol.
A soldier is classified as an "identified" abuser if he illegally possesses controlled
substances or paraphernalia. Evidence of such illegal possession may be obtained by an
inspection ordered by the commanding officer. An inspection may be for the express
purpose of seeking out contraband and need not be based on probable cause. The
circular provides that the individual should be present during an inspection, if possible,
and treated with dignity. However, the search may be extremely thorough; military
police and drug detector dogs can be used.
Once a soldier is classified as an "identified" abuser he is immediately subjected to a
urinalysis test and referred to the Community Drug and Alcohol Assistance Center
(CDAAC) to be medically confirmed, treated, and rehabilitated, or discharged if
rehabilitation is unsuccessful. Rehabilitation may be conducted in a medical treatment
facility or through such administrative "tools" as withdrawal of the privilege to wear
civilian clothing, own a driver's license, or drink alcohol. Segregation and/or a require-
ment that an abuser keep his door unlocked when his room is occupied may also be
imposed. Medically confirmed abusers are also subject to 300-day follow-ups during
which unannounced urinalysis tests will be required. 518 F.2d at 468-69.
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 939 (D.D.C. 1974).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 941.
34. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). The different character of the military and of the
military mission requires a different application of constitutional protections.
35. 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This case involved a soldier's rights under the
first amendment to distribute antiwar literature in the combat zone of Viet Nam. It was
held that the greater the Government's interests, the greater is its right to prescribe
reasonable regulations. In deciding for the Government the court noted that the
governmental interest is manifest in the context of a military combat zone.
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given civilians. 36 Thus, in determining the reasonableness of an intrusion the
special exigencies of military needs help tip the balance in favor of
constitutionality.3
7
In examining the search and seizure provisions of the circular, the court
found that military needs outweighed individual liberties. 38  The court noted
that widespread use of drugs hampered military effectiveness, and that the
primary purpose of the drug inspections was to make disfunctional service-
men effective soldiers. 39  Furthermore, since the expectation of privacy is
lower in the military and the unannounced drug inspections were the most
effective means of identifying drug abusers, the searches were held
constitutional. 40
The court disagreed, however, with the lower court's finding that informa-
tion obtained through such procedures could not constitutionally be used for
any non-rehabilitative purpose. 4I Following strong precedent,42 the court
ruled that since the exclusionary rule is grounded on a policy of deterrence,
it is applicable only when the search itself is unreasonable. 43  Evidence ob-
tained by these procedures could, therefore, be used against the soldier for
any unrelated purpose nothwithstanding the fact that the drug inspection
program was supposedly for rehabilitative purposes only.
4 4
III. CONCLUSION
The test for finding unconstitutional infringement of fourth and fifth
amendment guarantees involves a balancing of interests. Thus, when the
need for governmental intrusions outweighs the value of individual rights,
procedures necessary to assure that a search is reasonable may be relaxed.
There is no doubt that these procedures are relaxed in the military context.
Callaway demonstrates that courts must in each case consciously balance
the interests involved. In Callaway the court takes cognizance of the inter-
ests which the Government seeks to maintain, but spends no time discussing
losses which befall the plaintiff class. The court fails to deal with the
possibility that the searches would probably be unconstitutional if conducted
for purely punitive reasons and that a search may be constitutional for one
36. This is not discriminatory to soldiers. The Supreme Court has held that
embedded in our traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to
challenge that statute on the grounds that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutional-
ly to others in situations not before the court. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
610 (1973).
37. Carolson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
38. 518 F.2d at 466.
39. Id. at 476.
40. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Hagopian v. Knowlton,
470 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1972). Although it is true that the circular attempted to
safeguard the dignity of the soldier insofar as practical, the court in its opinion treated
only superficially the soldier's liberties which were being infringed.
41. 518 F.2d at 479.
42. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See notes 23, 24 supra and
accompanying text.
43. 518 F.2d at 475.
44. Id. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); United States
v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1973).
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purpose yet unconstitutional for another. To apply a blanket rule that once
a search is declared lawful its fruits may be used for any purpose is unwise
when policy and reason dictate another approach. The express purposes of
USAREUR Circular 600-85 could be achieved without a loss of constitutional
rights by prohibiting the use of evidence obtained for any non-rehabilitative
purpose.
J. Nicholson Meindl
